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Enabling small-scale water providers in Kibera
Shagun Mehrotra1 and Alain Morel2, Kenya
TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
THE SMALL-SCALE providers are significant actors in the
provision of services to the urban poor. This paper focuses
on preparing pragmatic tasks to enable the water providers
operating in informal settlements and deals with the issues
of price, quality and abstraction. It is conceived in the
context of the present government reforms in Kenya and
addresses the water needs of the urban poor. This is also
part of the present interest of the Water and Sanitation
Program (WSP)- Africa that is working with clients to find
pragmatic ways to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals in Africa.
Background
In the context of past studies on small-scale private providers
(SSPs) and service provision to the urban poor this paper
breaks away from the efforts of documenting the various
kinds of SSPs. Although the paper derives much of its initial
understanding from previous records on SSPs it makes a
significant shift in focus by exploring the approach of
constructive engagement in issues involving, enabling and
regulating operations of the water kiosks – the predominant
mode of SSPs in Kibera.
With a population estimated to be 500,000 the informal
settlement of Kibera is home to a third of the population of
the City of Nairobi. The settlement covers an area of about
250 hectares, with a density of over 2,000 people per
hectare. This distinguishes Kibera from other informal
settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa making it one of the
largest and most densely populated, providing the obvious
benefit of economies of scale. Although it lacks the presence
of local industrial activity, like similar settlements in Asia;
Dharavi, Mumbai, with one million inhabitants on 175
hectare of land has an estimated annual turnover of US
$300–400 million. Kibera has a strong presence of local
private entrepreneurs all serving the daily needs of the
communities.
A significant constraint in poverty reduction of the
people of Kibera is the state of the living environment. This
is largely a product of a legal gap, unclear policy framework
and lack of effective action to improve living conditions.
Inadequate water supply and sanitation are among the
most serious environmental concerns posed to the people
of Kibera. Most people in Kibera get water from private
water kiosks operators who lay long plastic pipes (at times
as much as 1,500 meters) from the city utility’s main
network and transport the water to store in tanks (with 2
to 6 m3 capacity). Then the water is retailed to the consumers.
The picture below (Figure 1) shows one such junction
where numerous kiosk operators abstract water from the
central utility network in Kibera. Often the pipe is laid
amidst garbage and open drains. This results in
contamination of the water even before it reaches the
storage tanks. The next section provides a brief description
of the steps involved in the research.
Methodology and objective
This action research was initiated with a rapid review of
past studies to identify and prioritize significant constraints.
As a next step one enabling mechanisms for each of the
three stakeholders was prepared (government’s licensing,
consumer forum and local private sector’s self regulation).
Then, these mechanisms were discussed with various
stakeholders inviting their feedback on the risks and benefits
for each of the options. The feedback was through a series
of workshops (involving consumers and SSPs) and focus
interviews with government representatives. Subsequently
the results were presented to the various stakeholders and
their comments were incorporated into the research process.
Mechanism one: this had the government as the enabler
and involved use of licensing and introducing local
government offices within the communities in order improve
access to the consumer and reduce the response time
(similar attempts have shown successful results in Dhaka,
Bangladesh).
Mechanism two: had the consumer as the central actor and
proposed the use of a consumer forum to enable the
activities of the water providers.
Mechanism three: proposed the use of self-organization by
the private water providers (also based on a similar local
success in Nairobi where the private waste collectors have
formed an association and adopted a code of conduct)
Although these mechanisms (see table one) are not
mutually exclusive and absolutely effective in isolation,
they were adopted to initiate the study. The responses of the
Figure 1: Children collect precious water in the red tub
from leaking pipes.
256
MEHROTRA and MOREL
government and the civil society group consultations were
not restricted to the review of the three mechanisms but
they also explored how power groups operate and could
adapt to the use of these methods in order to make them
effective in the local context. The primary objective of the
study was to derive pragmatic tasks, involving stakeholders
to addressing the issues of price, quality and abstraction of
water in Kibera.
Table 1: Mechanisms and risks
Stakeholder Mechanism Risk
Public sector Licensing Rent seeking
Civil society Consumer forum Lack of voice 
tenants
Private sector Self-organization2 Cartels
Findings
Some of the critical issues from the stakeholder perspectives
were:
Government
As the consumption of water by the residents of Kibera was
a small fraction of the total cities water supply (<10%) and
the revenue officially collected was an insignificant amount
(<1% of the SSPs officially pay their dues) there was
relatively less incentive to initiate effective action. What
summarised the government’s perspective on enabling water
kiosks is well represented in an article titled “Rogue water
vendors are put on notice” (see figure 2). This was issued
to reduce unaccounted for water (UFW) due to theft and
leakage but appears to be a very unilateral and harsh
approach towards the SSPs.
Consumer
As most of the resident in Kibera are tenants and the kiosk
owners landlords, the consumer lacked voice and indicated
the use of mod justice or media as options for them to take
action under circumstances of extreme water shortage (a
time when the prices sore exceptionally high, as much as 20
KES3 for a 20 litre jerry-can, see figure 3). Besides, there is
evidence that the consumers in Kibera together pay about
2.4 million KES every day4 for the water they consume
(probably a significant amount if compared to the average
revenue collected by NCC expressed as collection per day).
Private sector
Despite facing significant constraints in the registration
process and incurring high costs (due to official and
unofficially fees) the small scale providers are concerned
with improving the service. It is in their interest to reduce
constraint in the operations in order to expand their
business. Over 80% of the water providers are landlords
and the estimated capital investment by each private vendor
is about 2,000 US Dollars (or total of US$ 1.2 million for
Kibera; a per capita cost of about US$ 2.6) where at least
a quarter of it is paid as bribe.
Discussion
The action research had intense engagements that lead to
the independent formation of Maji Bora Kibera (MBK,
Better Water for Kibera in Swahili) – a self-organization of
water Kiosk owners. The true effectiveness of this association
would be revealed with time and would require a monitoring
of the activities of the organization. The association intends
to organize constructive negotiations between the
stakeholders – public, private sector and civil society – in
order to form effective enabling mechanism that adopt an
incentive and penalty (carrot and stick) approach in a
pragmatic manner.
Incentive and penalty approach, an example
Expanding service and increasing competition may be an
incentive for the government, as it would lower the price of
water and improve access to the people, but may also be a
little penalty for the kiosk owners as it may initially affect
their income. On the other hand reducing rent seeking would
be an incentive for the kiosk owners as their investment and
running costs would reduce and a little disciplining for the
government staff as their informal revenue would decrease.
This approach would provide incentive for various
stakeholders to gain something while they are made liable to
comply with some enabling methods. The mechanism of self-
organization tends to offer some benefits while posing some
risks as well. Some of these are listed in table two that
follows:
Table 2: Risks and benefits of Self-organizing
Risk
1. Formation of Cartels
2. May not lead to a price benefit to end users
3. Still dependent on central utility
Benefits
1. Sustainable as driven by enlightened self interest
2. Effective as regulated through peer pressure
3. Uses a Incentive and penalty approach
Figure 2.
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Lessons learned
Some of the key erudition is stated below:
1. Many problems have origins in the public sector:
Although not recognized to the fullest by the utility, rent
seeking is a critical issue and is evident with the allegation
made by the Kiosk owners (they claim that 10 million
KES were found in the account of the meter reader).
Besides this managing shortages of water yield s power
to various interested groups leading to channels for
extortion, thus making it a self perpetuating cycle of
shortage, veiled power and rent seeking.
2. Structural reforms: Like the present efforts in the water
sector in Kenya it can become a self generating activity
and may loose its initial purpose - like in some
organizations with more than 800 employees there can
be enough work internally to keep people totally
occupied. Also the past efforts in utility reform have
indicated that change in the administrative structure
may not automatically result in the change of mindsets.
Thus it may be relevant to indulge in strategic
interventions and target reforms to enable existing
systems that work – for example enable kiosk rather
than replacing them.
3. Voice: There is a need to provide the local private
enterprise involved in water vending – essentially Kiosks-
with a platform to effectively negotiate on issues of rent
seeking, bulk pricing and billing with city council (the
present utility operator).
• Media, an effective option to express voice specifically
for issues that cannot be resolved locally by individual
vendors.
• Mob justice5 and demonstrations have proven to be an
effective last resort. Something that raises serious concern
as it amounts to taking the law in their hands.
4. Power groups: the power of local social institutions
need to be explored as an alternative means of
introducing effectiveness in enabling frameworks for
service delivery practices.
• Reaching out through religious institutions and families
applying social marketing strategies
• Finding systems that benefit from the coordination of
administrative (Village Chief) and political (Councillor)
efforts rather than be counterproductive. At present
there is a conflict of interest in their activities as the
former represents the interests of the government while
the other represent those of the people.
5. Other areas of interest: that emerged as results of this
action research are:
• The role of SSPs in the context of future utility
privatisation.
• The role of SSPs in delivering sanitation facilities in a
similar market based venture.
• What roles would the consumer and the government
play in self-organization by kiosk owners?
• How this approach can be up-scaled and replicated in
other parts of Kibera, Kenya and Africa?
Orientations
Some pragmatic tasks to peruse
1. PRICE: Regarding the issue of price the study sums up
with the understanding that the two significant actions
that need to be taken are:
a. Reducing price of bulk water from 34.5 KES (as presently
paid by various kiosk owners) to 10 KES (as officially
required by the city council tariff structure).
b. Reducing rent seeking that result from constraints in
registration and O&M.
This would require a sit down discussion between the kiosk
owners in the association (MBK) followed by a constructive
negotiation between the city council and MBK representatives.
As it is in the common interest of both the organizations to
rapidly address the high per unit price paid by the consumers
in Kibera it is likely to happen quickly (although it is conflicting
with the interest of the lower level utility staff that benefit from
informal payments, at present there is substantial commitment
at the senior level managers to address these issues). It may also
result in a better officially recorded payment rate and reduction
in investment costs of the kiosk owners leading to a quick drop
in price for the consumer.
2. QUALITY: Here we refer to contamination during supply
(in plastic pipes laid by kiosk owners), storage and
handling during sales in Kibera
a. Egg for garbage campaign: as observed during field work
it is evident that the issue of water quality is largely
effected by the poor waste management and the laying of
water supply pipes along open sewers. To address this it
is proposed to initiate a quick clean up exercise in Kibera.
On one end it would require some incentive to the
communities to gather solid waste and on the other hand
some coordination by a private/public garbage collection
organization to take it to the landfill sites. It is proposed
to launch an egg/banana for garbage exchange. This is
only an option; any other technique that works is also
welcome (another example was the Saturday whistle
where an NGO use to send a volunteer who would go
every Saturday and whistle reminding neighbourhoods
that it was time to clean up and it worked, although it has
 Figure 3: Orange bar indicates price of water in Kibera
during various stages of supply. In the case of extreme
shortage the per unit cost of water sores higher than
the average cost of water in France and Germany.
Source: Mehrotra and Morel WSP- Af, KISIMA Apr 2003
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not sustained.)
b. Peep shows & consumer rating: allow consumers to
freely peep into the tank prior to procuring water from the
kiosks. This would create better awareness among the
consumer and would be an incentive for the kiosk operators
to regularly maintain their water storage tanks. Along
with this if the consumers has an opportunity to rate the
service in their village and put it in the newspaper or
announce it over the weekends on RADIO KISS (local
radio channel) or other popular media it would be an
effective means of providing the consumer with a voice.
There is a need to involve the media, as it would significantly
facilitate in strengthening the consumer’s voice while
maintaining some degree of, much required anonymity.
3. ABSTRACTION: this refers to the process of withdrawing
water from the central utility.
a. Stop the leakage campaign: need to encourage the
identification of leakage points in order to reduce UFW.
This could be done through community participation.
b. Engagement: an organized discussion between the kiosk
owners regarding their constraints in price, quality and
abstraction and a preparation of a clear and precise
agenda should be followed by a constructive negotiation
between the city council and the kiosk owners association.
4. GENERAL SHORT-TERM ACTIONS
a. Getting MBK organized – MBK may require a few more
consultations and workshops in order to get the association
organized and if necessary registered.
b. Engagements with NCC/ Maji House6 – it would be
critical to facilitate the meeting of MBK with the city
council and when relevant the regulatory board to discuss
the issues mentioned above and work towards a mutually
acceptable solution.
c. Strengthening the consumer: as many of the consumers
are tenants and kiosk operators are land lords there is a
need to strengthen the voice of the consumer through the
effective use of local media (a unique strength of Kenya is
the critical and open media).
d. Educating the Kiosk operators: an effective method to
address the issues of price, quality and abstraction would
be to hold training programs for the kiosk operators to
educate them on the health and environmental implications
of their business, the social side of their economic activity
and work with them to address these concerns. It may be
worth investing in training and capacity building of the
local private enterprise (most of the past effort have
focused on the public sector).
It is the author’s conviction that the most effective solution shall
be a result of constructive negotiations between the stakeholders
and should not be academic propositions. Thus the penalty
and reward approach that is recommended would be best
elaborated with the results of real engagements. Although the
recommendations of this action research have been considered
for implementation, the effectiveness shall be evident with the
due course of its execution and a smile from the little children
who roam the streets of Kibera.
Conclusions
As the SSP are most affected by the present set-up, the study
indicates that they are interested in improving water services.
Contrary to popular belief they are keen on reducing the price
of water and improving their service, as they see an opportunity
to expand their business and enter other sections of the sector
like, pay and use showers and sanitation units. The issue is not
the availability of capital (as demonstrated by the investment
made by the local private enterprise) as much as it is of
considering the local power structure and initiating mechanism
that involving a dialogue between the three key stakeholders,
serving their interests and applying a simple incentive and
penalty approach. The solutions would best evolve as a result
of stakeholder engagement in constructive negotiations and
premeditated academic propositions should be avoided.
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selling price of a jerry-can]
5Term used by the residents of Kibera to indicate acts when
the people take the law into their own hands
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and Maji House is the Ministry of Water Government of
Kenya.
